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Peerless Insurance Co. v. Freeman: Adding to the Confusion
Involved in Terminating an Insurance Policy According to North
Carolina's Financial Responsibility Legislation
The Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of 19571 imposes a requirement
of proof of liability insurance protection on all owners of state-registered motor
vehicles. Because evidence of continuous policy coverage is essential to provide
such proof,2 the statute includes extensive restrictions affecting the termination
of an otherwise ordinary contractual relationship. 3 North Carolina precedent
interpreting the restrictive provision reflects confusion among members of both
the insurance business and the legal profession regarding the distinction between
acts of termination attributed to the insured, which require no notice from the
insurer, and those attributed to the insurer, which necessitate the prescribed no-
tice.4 Although it effectively addressed the question of timeliness of notice of
cancellation under North Carolina's version of financial responsibility legisla-
tion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Peerless Insurance Co. v. Freeman 5
raised troublesome issues of public policy and legislative intent regarding un-
compensated extended insurance coverage. Despite the apparent clarity of the
majority's technical holding, Judge Johnson's opinion failed to alleviate the per-
sistent ambiguities surrounding the notice provision and neglected to articulate
its justification for elevating the concerns of irresponsible policy holders over
those of the insurance industry.
Great American Insurance Company issued an automobile liability policy
to Nathan Freeman on February 5, 1981, for a term of six months. 6 Having
received $30 of the $53.77 premium due from Freeman on August 27, Great
American allegedly renewed the policy for an additional six-month period.7 On
October 14, 1981, the company mailed an "Automobile Final Notice" to Free-
man requesting payment of the balance due and warning him that it would can-
cel his policy on November 1 should he fail to comply. 8 Although Freeman
tendered the balance on November 5, 1981, Great American sent him an "Auto-
mobile Cancellation Notice" on the same day, stating that it had canceled his
policy as of November 1 and that his check would be returned.9
Freeman was involved in an automobile accident on November 8, 1981, for
1. Act of June 12, 1957, ch. 1393, §§ 1-3, 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws 1586 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (1983)).
2. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 35 (1980).
3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310 (1983).
4. See infra notes 40-78 and accompanying text.
5. 78 N.C. App. 774, 338 S.E.2d 570, aff'dper curiam, 317 N.C. 145, 343 S.E.2d 539 (1986).
6. Id. at 775, 338 S.E.2d at 570.
7. Id. at 775, 338 S.E.2d at 570-71.
8. Id. at 775, 338 S.E.2d at 571. The document also advised Freeman of the following infor-
mation: his right to request a review by or a hearing before the Commissioner of Insurance, his duty
to obtain replacement insurance, and the penalties for driving without maintaining continuous finan-
cial responsibility. Record at 28, Peerless (No. 852DC347); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310(f)(4)-(5)
(1983).
9. Record at 29, Peerless.
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which Great American denied coverage.10 As insurer for the other driver, Peer-
less Insurance Company paid the damages under an uninsured motorists policy
and sought subrogation" from Freeman, who filed a third-party complaint 12
against Great American. 13 At a hearing before the District Court of Beaufort
County, North Carolina, Freeman stipulated that Peerless' motion for summary
judgment 14 against him should be allowed.' 5 The court granted Peerless' mo-
tion as well as a motion for summary judgment in favor of Freeman, but denied
Great American's motion for summary judgment.' 6
Great American appealed, asserting that the trial court had erred in decid-
ing that Great American's actions were ineffective to terminate Freeman's pol-
icy. 17 The applicable notice provisions of the financial responsibility statute
prohibit the insurer from canceling or refusing to renew an automobile insurance
policy unless the insured "fails to discharge when due any of his obligations in
connection with the payment of premium for the policy or any installment
thereof ... ."18 In such instance the insurer must send the insured notice of
termination disclosing the effective date, fifteen days from the date of mailing or
delivery.19 Comparing the forms Great American sent to Freeman with the
10. Peerless, 78 N.C. App. at 774, 338 S.E.2d at 570.
11. "Subrogation is the right of the insurer to be put in the position of the insured in order to
pursue recovery from third parties legally responsible to the insured for a loss paid by the insurer."
16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 61:1 (2d ed. 1983). "Subrogation... is designed
to compel discharge of the obligation by the one who in equity should bear the loss." Id.
12. "At any time after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may
cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may
be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, Rule
14(a) (1983).
13. Peerless, 78 N.C. App. at 774, 338 S.E.2d at 570.
14. A summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ IA-I, Rule 56(c) (1983).
15. Peerless, 78 N.C. App. at 774, 338 S.E.2d at 570.
16. Id. at 775, 338 S.E.2d at 571.
17. Id.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-310(d)(1), (e)(4) (1983). The relevant sections of the statute read
as follows:
(d) No insurer shall cancel a policy of automobile insurance except for the following
reasons:
(1) The named insured fails to discharge when due any of his obligations in connec-
tion with the payment of premium for the policy or any installment thereof ....
je)" No insurer shall refuse to renew a policy of automobile insurance except for one
or more of the following reasons:
(4)" The named insured fails to discharge when due any of his obligations in connec-
tion with the payment of premium for the policy or any installment thereof....
Id.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310(f)(2) (1983). The following language appears in this section:
(f) No cancellation or refusal to renew by an insurer of a policy of automobile insur-
ance shall be effective unless the insurer shall have given the policyholder notice at his last
known post-office address by certificate of mailing a written notice of the cancellation or
refusal to renew. Such notice shall:
(2) State the date, not less than 60 days after mailing to the insured of notice of
1410 [Vol. 65
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statutory notice requirements, the majority determined that Freeman had ac-
cepted the insurer's offer to renew with his partial payment and that his thirty
dollars provided coverage through October 14, 1981.20 Because Freeman was
not yet in default when Great American mailed its final notice, the document
was fatally premature as a notice of cancellation.
21
The cancellation notice dated November 5, 1981, was also defective in fail-
ing to allow fifteen days prior notice of the effective date of cancellation.2 2 As
Judge Phillips concluded in his concurring opinion, "G.S. 20-310 authorizes the
cancellation of automobile liability policies only for the existing causes stated
and upon advance notice as provided therein; it does not authorize either pro-
spective or retroactive cancellation."' 23 Because Great American had not satis-
factorily terminated Freeman's policy, it remained in force on the date of the
accident and covered the resulting damages.24
Great American argued that such an interpretation of statutory provisions
would grant the insured an extension of the policy for which the insurer would
remain uncompensated.25 Instead, Great American contended that the general
assembly must have contemplated a requirement that notice of cancellation be
conditional, thereby granting the insured an opportunity to satisfy any obliga-
tions to the insurer within a specified time period.26 Judge Johnson dismissed
the argument stating: "We believe the Legislature was advertent to the possibil-
ity of such gaps in the statute."27
In his dissent Judge Webb agreed with the majority's recognition of a fif-
teen-day grace period beyond the contractual terms of the policy; however, he
maintained that Great American had fulfilled the statutory requirements. 28 Be-
cause Freeman had never provided full consideration for the first six months of
the insurance contract, he had been in default since August.29 If interpreted as a
statement that payment was past due, the final notice effectively canceled the
policy on November 1, 1981.30
Great American appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.
3 1
Although the appellate court's opinion frequently referred to Smith v. Nation-
cancellation or notice of intention not to renew, on which such cancellation or refusal to
renew shall become effective, except that such effective date may be 15 days from the date
of mailing or delivery when it is being canceled or not renewed for the reasons set forth in
subdivision (1) of subsection (d) and in subdivision (4) of subsection (e) of this section ....
Id.
20. Peerless, 78 N.C. App. at 776, 338 S.E.2d at 571.
21. Id. at 776-77, 338 S.E.2d at 571-72.
22. Id. at 777, 338 S.E.2d at 572.
23. Id. at 778, 338 S.E.2d at 572 (Phillips, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 777, 338 S.E.2d at 572.
25. Appellant's Brief at 4, Peerless.
26. Id.
27. Peerless, 78 N.C. App. at 777, 338 S.E.2d at 572.
28. Id. at 778, 338 S.E.2d at 572 (Webb, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 317 N.C. 145, 343 S.E.2d 539 (1986) (per curiam).
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wide Mutual Insurance Co.,32 which was subsequently reversed on appeal, the
supreme court nevertheless upheld the Peerless decision.33 The per curiam opin-
ion stated that the logic of the appellate court's opinion alone supported its in-
terpretation of the notice provisions of the Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Act.
3 4
Financial responsibility legislation, the practical equivalent of which exists
in every state,35 is an attempt to assure some compensation for victims of traffic
accidents by regulating the rights and obligations of both the insured and the
insurer.36 To achieve these goals, the statutes are liberally construed to protect
the state's motorists, so that contractual provisions of the policies are
subordinate to public policy evidenced by legislation.37 North Carolina's ver-
sion establishes a compulsory liability insurance requirement as a prerequisite to
valid registration of a motor vehicle with the State.38 If such insurance coverage
lapses for any reason, the insurer must notify the Division of Motor Vehicles,
which may revoke the insured's registration. 39
The insurer's obligations to its insured upon termination of a policy depend
on the circumstances resulting in the conclusion of the contractual relation-
ship-that is, whether the termination constitutes a rejection of an offer to re-
new by the insured or a refusal to renew or cancellation by the insurer. North
Carolina case law, however, illustrates that specifically categorizing terminations
continues to be a problem. In the 1961 case of Faizan v. Grain Dealers Mutual
Insurance Co.,4° distinguished on its facts in Peerless,41 the North Carolina
Supreme Court considered the situation in which the insurer advised the insured
of the renewal premium due, but the insured failed to respond.42 According to
Justice Moore's opinion, the renewal premium notice, indicating the conse-
quences of non-payment, was an offer which Faizan rejected by silence and by
applying for other insurance.43 Because a rejection by the insured could not be
characterized as termination "by an insurer," 44 the expiration of the policy did
32. 71 N.C. App. 69, 321 S.E.2d 498 (1984), aff'd on rehg, 72 N.C. App. 400, 324 S.E.2d 868,
rev'd, 315 N.C. 262, 337 S.E.2d 569 (1985). For details of prior and subsequent history of the Smith
decision, see infra text accompanying notes 52-63.
33. Peerless, 317 N.C. at 145, 343 S.E.2d at 539.
34. Id.
35. 12A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:721 n.7 (2d ed. 1981).
36. Id, § 45:723.
37. 7 Am. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 29 (1980).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (1983). In the alternative an owner may prove financial respon-
sibility by acquiring a financial security bond or deposit or by qualifying as a self-insurer. Id. § 20-
309(b).
39. Id. § 20-309(e).
40. 254 N.C. 47, 118 S.E.2d 303 (1961).
41. 78 N.C. App. at 777, 338 S.E.2d at 572.
42. The insurance company notified Faizan that his policy would expire unless he renewed by
payment of premium. After the due date had passed, the company sent a notice of termination to be
effective in 15 days. Faizan was later involved in an accident. Faizan, 254 N.C. at 48-50, 118 S.E.2d
at 303-05.
43. Id. at 59, 118 S.E.2d at 311-12.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310(f) (1983).
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not trigger the notice requirements of the financial responsibility statute.45
Ten years later, despite subsequent statutory amendments involving notice
to the Department of Motor Vehicles, 46 the supreme court relied on Faizan in
the similar case of Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cotten.47 Nationwide
sent a renewal premium notice containing an express offer to renew by payment.
When Cotten failed to respond, Nationwide sent a termination notice, then noti-
fied the Department of Motor Vehicles. Cotten later became involved in an acci-
dent.48 Irrespective of the duty to notify the insured, Cotten argued that
termination was contingent on the notification of the Department of Motor Ve-
hicles.49 Construing Cotten's silence with respect to Nationwide's offer to re-
new, Justice Lake concluded that the amended notice provisions had "no
bearing upon the authority of the Faizan case on the question of what consti-
tutes a termination 'by the insured.' "50 Because the administrative purposes of
notifying the department were distinct from the public policy purposes of notify-
ing the insured, failure to notify the department would not obstruct the valid
termination of the insurance contract.
With the theory of termination by the insured apparently settled by Faizan
and Cotten, the general assembly enacted a new provision incorporating the dis-
tinction as follows:
(g) Nothing in this section shall apply:
(1) If the insurer has manifested its willingness to renew by issu-
ing or offering to issue a renewal policy, certificate or other evidence of
renewal, or has manifested such intention by any other means;
(2) If the named insured has notified in writing the insurer or its
agent that he wishes the policy to be canceled or that he does not wish
the policy to be renewed .... 51
In an attempt to interpret the amendment in 1984 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals analyzed the issue in Smith v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 5 2
When Smith failed to reply to Nationwide's renewal premium notice, the policy
45. Faizan, 254 N.C. at 59, 118 S.E.2d at 312. Because § 20-310 did not obligate the insurer to
take further action, the termination notice was superfluous and, therefore, irrelevant to the holding.
Id. at 56-57, 118 S.E.2d at 309-10.
46. In 1963 the general assembly deleted the requirement of after the fact notice of termination
to the Department of Motor Vehicles in favor of the following language: "No insurance policy...
may be terminated by cancellation or otherwise by the insurer without having given the North Caro-
lina Motor Vehicles Department notice of such cancellation fifteen (15) days prior to effective date of
cancellation." Act of June 18, 1963, ch. 964, § 1, 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 1221, 1222 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309(e) (1983)). A later amendment expressly distinguished be-
tween termination by the insured and by the insurer stating, "Where the insurance policy is termi-
nated by the insured the insurer shall immediately notify the Department of Motor Vehicles .... "
Act of April 16, 1965, ch. 272, § 1, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 303, 303 (amended by Act of July 15,
1983, ch. 761, § 146, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 790, 843).
47. 280 N.C. 20, 185 S.E.2d 182 (1971).
48. Id. at 22-23, 185 S.E.2d at 183-84.
49. Id. at 29, 185 S.E.2d at 188.
50. Id. at 28, 185 S.E.2d at 187.
51. Act of July 21, 1971, ch. 1205, § 4, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1766, 1772 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-310(g) (1983)).
52. 71 N.C. App. 69, 321 S.E.2d 498 (1984), aff'd on reh'g, 72 N.C. App. 400, 324 S.E.2d 868,
rev'd, 315 N.C. 262, 337 S.E.2d 569 (1985).
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lapsed and Nationwide later mailed an "Expiration Notice," purporting to allow
an additional sixteen days from the date of expiration in which the policy could
be reinstated.53 An accident occurred during the grace period, 54 and Nation-
wide refused Smith's belated tender of the full premium.55 In his opinion for the
court, Judge Eagles reasoned that the expiration notice failed to provide the
requisite warnings and prospective notice period to effectively cancel the pol-
icy.5 6 In addition, the court held that Smith's attempt to reinstate the policy
was inconsistent with the argument that he had rejected Nationwide's offer to
renew.
57
On rehearing the court of appeals determined that the expiration notice was
a defective refusal to renew rather than an attempt to cancel.5 8 Because the
premium notice contained no advice concerning the consequences of non-pay-
ment, it was merely a statement of the balance due and did not constitute an
offer to renew.59 According to Judge Eagles, "G.S. 20-310(g) retains its purpose
to allow an insurer to avoid the requirements of G.S. 20-310(f) where the in-
surer has manifested its willingness to renew and the insured unequivocally re-
jects the renewal .... -6o
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision
on the grounds that such a restrictive interpretation of subsection (g) would
destroy its purpose of relieving the insurer of responsibility once it has apprised
the insured of his or her policy status and the contract has subsequently ex-
pired.61 By providing notice of pending expiration and opportunity to renew,
Nationwide clearly communicated an offer and was entitled to rely on Smith's
failure to respond as a rejection. 62 Citing both Faizan and Cotten, Justice Mar-
tin concluded that the protection afforded the insured by the notice require-
ments of the financial responsibility statute was unnecessary when the decision
to continue coverage was in the hands of the insured rather than the insurer.63
On the other hand, when the insurer has reason to believe the insured might
accept a clear offer to renew, the statute mandates strict compliance with its
instructions for refusal to renew. The supreme court in Smith distinguished Per-
kins v. American Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 4 in which Perkins financed his
premium with a producing agency under the assigned risk plan.65 Erroneously
53. Id. at 72, 321 S.E.2d at 500.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 75, 321 S.E.2d at 502.
56. Id. at 74, 321 S.E.2d at 501.
57. Id. at 75, 321 S.E.2d at 502.
58. Smith, 72 N.C. App. at 401, 324 S.E.2d at 870.
59. Id. at 406-07, 324 S.E.2d at 873.
60. Id. at 408, 324 S.E.2d at 873.
61. Smith, 315 N.C. at 272, 337 S.E.2d at 575.
62. Id. at 268-69, 337 S.E.2d at 573.
63. Id. at 272, 337 S.E.2d at 575.
64. 274 N.C. 134, 161 S.E.2d 536 (1968); see Smith, 315 N.C. at 271-72, 337 S.E.2d at 575.
65. Perkins, 274 N.C. at 136, 161 S.E.2d at 537. The insured dealt with Terry Insurance
Agency in procuring his policy, but the North Carolina Assigned Risk Plan assigned his insurance
risk to American Mutual Fire Insurance Company, which actually became a party to his insurance
contract. Id. at 135, 161 S.E.2d at 537. The assigned risk plan is an element of the Motor Vehicle
1414 [V/ol. 65
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assuming it was paying in full, the agency forwarded a substantial portion of the
premium to the contracting company. 66 Having received notice of the agency's
uncertainty as to the amount due, the insurer could not rely on the insufficient
acceptance as a rejection. 67 As a unilateral act of the insurance company, the
termination of Perkins' policy was ineffective without prospective notice.68
Similarly, the court of appeals in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Da-
vis 69 established that the insurer may not avoid the notice provisions when its
alleged offer is vague. The premium notice Nationwide sent to Davis contained
neither a reference to expiration of the policy nor any warning of the conse-
quences of non-payment; therefore, it merely presented a statement of the ac-
count due.70 Because renewal is a "bilateral transaction involving both an offer
and acceptance," the failure to make an absolute offer prior to expiration re-
sulted in a unilateral refusal to renew on the part of the insurer.71 Under these
circumstances prior notification of termination to the insured was necessary to
provide an opportunity to rectify a potential violation of the law.
72
Once an insurer commits itself to a contract with the insured, mid-term
cancellation jeopardizes the insured's driving privileges even more seriously than
a refusal to renew. In Crisp v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
7 3
the company accepted partial payment from the insured and, following a change
in coverage, billed him for the balance due.74 After the due date had passed,
State Farm sent the insured a cancellation notice to take effect in fifteen days.
75
Applying the terms of the Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act to State Farm's
attempted termination, the supreme court determined that the statute controlled
the contract to the extent that even non-payment was no defense to a claim
when the appropriate procedure had not been followed.76 State Farm had ne-
glected to advise the insured of the necessity of maintaining continuous financial
responsibility, a requirement Justice Moore found to be "not merely formal and
directory."'77 Particularly in a suit by an injured third party, for whom financial
responsibility legislation supposedly provides protection, the policy must remain
in force absent proof of compliance. 78
The North Carolina General Assembly derived its version of the statute
Safety-Responsibility Act, which requires all insurers doing business in North Carolina to accept a
certain percentage of high risk applicants for automobile liability insurance in order to make insur-
ance readily available to all drivers. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.34 (1983).
66. Perkins, 274 N.C. at 136, 161 S.E.2d at 537.
67. Id. at 143, 161 S.E.2d at 542.
68. Id. at 142-43, 161 S.E.2d at 542.
69. 7 N.C. App. 152, 171 S.E.2d 601 (1970).
70. Id. at 159-60, 171 S.E.2d at 605.
71. Id. at 158, 171 S.E.2d at 604.
72. See Perkins, 274 N.C. at 140, 161 S.E.2d at 540.
73. 256 N.C. 408, 124 S.E.2d 149 (1962).
74. Id. at 410-11, 124 S.E.2d at 151.
75. Id. at 411, 124 S.E.2d at 151-52.
76. Id. at 413, 124 S.E.2d at 153.
77. Id. at 414, 124 S.E.2d at 154.
78. Id.
1987]
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from New York legislation, 79 the construction of which has proven equally am-
biguous. The 1959 case of Teeter v. Allstate Insurance Co. 80 presented the New
York judiciary with an opportunity to construe the Motor Vehicle Financial
Security Act of 1956. 8 1 Although Allstate had reason to rescind Teeter's policy
for misrepresentation of his accident record, the court refused to allow retroac-
tive cancellation to void the policy from inception.82 With respect to the notice
of cancellation requirements, the court concluded,
Once a certificate of insurance ... has been issued by the insur-
ance company and filed with the Commissioner, the contract of insur-
ance ceases to be a private contract between the parties. A
supervening public interest then attaches and restricts the rights of the
parties in accordance with the statutory provisions. Many common-
law contractual rights are restricted by the statute.8
3
In Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Williams84 the Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court considered the contractual prerequisites of offer
and acceptance regarding renewal. The insurer failed to locate the insured and,
therefore, tendered no offer to renew.85 Although the insured's default on previ-
ous occasions gave the insurer adequate reason to refuse to renew, the attempted
termination technically resulted from a unilateral act of the insurer, which was
ineffective without prior notice.8 6 In the subsequent case of Caristi v. Home
Indemnity Co.,87 the company also failed to provide a written offer of renewal to
the insured; however, the court distinguished Williams because the company
presented evidence that Caristi expressly rejected an oral offer.88
Unlike North Carolina decisions, New York courts did not develop an ex-
ception to the notice provisions of the financial responsibility statute when the
insured's silence constituted a rejection of an offer to renew resulting in termina-
tion.8 9 Three 1962 cases, each dealing with the insured's lack of response to a
79. See Perkins, 274 N.C. at 140-42, 161 S.E.2d at 540-41; Faizan, 254 N.C. at 57-59, 118
S.E.2d at 310-11. The 1956 New York statute read as follows:
No contract of insurance or renewal thereof for which a certificate of insurance has
been filed with the commissioner shall be terminated by cancellation or failure to renew by
the insurer until at least twenty days after mailing to the named insured at the address
shown on the policy a notice of termination, except where the cancellation is for non-
payment of premium in which case ten days notice of cancellation by the insurer shall be
sufficient.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 93-c (McKinney Supp. 1959).
80. 9 A.D.2d 176, 192 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 655, 173 N.E.2d 47, 212 N.Y.S.2d
71(1961).
81. Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act, ch. 655, 1956 N.Y. Laws 1457 (amended by Act of
April 23, 1959, ch. 775, 1959 N.Y. Laws 1855) (codified as amended at N.Y. VH. & TRAF. LAW
§§ 310-321 (McKinney 1986)).
82. Teeter, 9 A.D.2d at 180, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 614-15.
83. Id. at 181, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
84. 9 A.D.2d 461, 194 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1959).
85. Id. at 462, 194 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
86. Id. at 463, 194 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
87. 24 Misc. 2d 136, 202 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1960).
88. Id. at 137, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
89. Cf. supra notes 40-63 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina cases establishing
the theory of termination by the insured).
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renewal premium notice, resulted in extended coverage for the insured because
the insurer disregarded the notice provisions of the statute.90 In the words of
Justice Gorman in Monette v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,91 "an automo-
bile policy under the assigned risk plan cannot be terminated by the insured's
failure to accept the insurer's conditional offer to renew upon payment of the
premium."
92
The difficulties of distributing responsibility for termination of an automo-
bile liability policy, thereby determining the obligations of the insurer with re-
spect to notice, are common among states with compulsory liability insurance
laws.93 Few courts, however, have approached the subject of the time limita-
tions on the notice requirements with the specificity indicated in Peerless. In
states where the statutes are substantially similar to that of North Carolina-for
instance, Illinois and Connecticut 94 -retroactive notice is clearly contrary to
legislative intent. When the insurer in Green v. J C. Penney Auto Insurance
Co. 95 discovered that the insured's premium renewal check had been dishon-
ored, it attempted to cancel his policy as of the date of reinstatement.9 6 Deci-
sively rejecting the company's defense of its action, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that insurers would deprive the in-
sured of the opportunity to obtain other insurance as required by the Illinois
statute,9 7 unless the law prescribed notice prior to effective cancellation in all
instances of default.9 8
Similarly, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Hendrickson 9 9 the insurer accepted
half the renewal premium due and credited it to Hendrickson's account, but
subsequently notified him in an offer to reinstate that the original policy had
expired.1° The Connecticut Appellate Court determined that the company
misled the insured by crediting his account as if coverage had never lapsed.101
Under these circumstances the financial responsibility statute prevented the
company from asserting expiration retroactively by requiring ten days notice
prior to cancellation for non-payment of premium.102
On the other hand, at least one state has established that the grace period
prohibits the insurer from anticipating default in payment of premiums. In
90. See Monette v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 230 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1962); La Barre v. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co., 16 A.D.2d 842, 227 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1962); Mong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 A.D.2d,
257, 223 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1962).
91. 230 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1962).
92. Id. at 942.
93. See Annotation, Cancellation of Compulsory or 'inancial Responsibility" Automobile In-
surance, 44 A.L.R. 4TH 13 (1986).
94. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-175h (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 755.15 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1986).
95. 722 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1983).
96. Id. at 331.
97. Id. at 332.
98. Id. at 333.
99. 1 Conn. App. 409, 472 A.2d 356 (1984).
100. Id. at 410-11, 472 A.2d at 357.
101. Id. at 411-12, 472 A.2d at 358.
102. Id. at 412-13, 472 A.2d at 359.
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Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Person 10 3 the Georgia
Court of Appeals found that the insurer's incorporation of notice of the pre-
mium due and of prospective cancellation was unsatisfactory under state law. 104
As in North Carolina, Georgia's insurance statutes permitted the insurer to can-
cel for failure to discharge premium obligations "when due."105 In the appellate
court's estimation the company had no reason to give notice of cancellation
before the premium was due and could conclusively terminate the policy only
after a ten-day grace period following default.10 6
The practice of accepting partial payments introduces an additional compli-
cation to the grace period equation. According to the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals in McGarrah v. Stockton, 107 the consideration for an insurance contract is
indivisible even if paid in installments.108 In McGarrah the Missouri appellate
court relied on the 1915 case of Clifton v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.,1°9 in
which the North Carolina Supreme Court held: "Partial payment, even when
accepted as a partial payment, will not keep the policy alive even for such frac-
tional part of the year as the part payment bears to the whole payment." 110
Consequently, the insured in McGarrah was in default from the inception of the
policy so that the insurer's notice of the balance due and subsequent cancellation
were neither retroactive nor prospective."
In reaching its conclusion that the insurance company's prospective final
notice and retroactive cancellation notice were both defective, the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals in Peerless ignored most of the available authority on the
issue and misconstrued the landmark Faizan case as well as the recent Smith
decision. Although Judge Johnson distinguished Faizan on its facts, he relied on
its discussion of legislative intent regarding notice requirements.112 Upon care-
ful inspection, however, the section of the Faizan decision to which Judge John-
son referred elaborated on the procedure for notification of the Commissioner of
Insurance after termination, rather than notification of the insured before termi-
nation. 1 3 Moreover, Justice Moore in Faizan wrote in terms of "an hiatus of
103. 164 Ga. App. 488, 297 S.E.2d 80 (1982).
104. Id. at 489, 297 S.E.2d at 82.
105. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2430(e) (Supp. 1982).
106. Person, 164 Ga. App. at 489, 297 S.E.2d at 82.
107. 425 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. CL App. 1968).
108. Id. at 227.
109. 168 N.C. 499, 84 S.E. 817 (1915). The Clifton case involved a suit on a life insurance policy
after a default in installment payments. Id.
110. Id. at 500, 84 S.E. at 818; see also Klein v. Avemco Ins. Co., 289 N.C. 63, 66, 220 S.E.2d
595, 597 (1975) (quoting Clifton for the proposition that installments previously paid for airplane
insurance may not be pro-rated). The foremost treatise in the area of insurance law includes the
following similar language also quoted in McGarrah:
The obligation to pay the premium when due is ordinarily an indivisible obligation to
pay the entire premium, so that a forfeiture is not prevented by part payment thereof. This
means that a part payment will not keep the policy in force for even such a proportionate
part of the new period as the sum paid bears to the whole premium due.
6 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 32:111 (2d ed. 1985).
111. McGarrah, 425 S.W.2d at 227.
112. Peerless, 78 N.C. App. at 777, 338 S.E.2d at 572.
113. Faizan, 254 N.C. at 55, 118 S.E.2d at 309.
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fifteen days or more in insurance coverage," ' " 4 not an extension of policy cover-
age. Because the prescribed subsequent notice to the Commissioner posed no
obstacle to an effective termination fifteen days earlier, the Faizan court was
concerned with the gaps between coverage, 115 during which the former policy
holder could continue to drive uninsured.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the citation in
Peerless to the subsequently reversed Smith case was not determinative in the
final analysis, 1 6 the appellate court's opinion presented the statements regard-
ing statutory construction out of context, again illustrating the weakness of its
rationale. Judge Johnson relied on the decision on rehearing in Smith for the
proposition that the statute contemplated an extension of insurance coverage
because any other construction "would render the protection offered to the mo-
toring public by these statutes meaningless." ' 1 7 Such an interpretation is mis-
leading because the Smith opinion applied this language to refute an unrelated
argument that the insurer's offer to renew has legal effect independently of its
acceptance or rejection by the insured. 1 8 In relying on the Faizan and Smith
decisions to dismiss the defendant insurance company's objections to an uncom-
pensated extension of Freeman's policy coverage, the Peerless majority contrib-
uted to the confusion surrounding methods of termination and the requisite
notice procedures and left the insurer's valid point unanswered.
Obviously, the general assembly had the authority to alter common law
contractual rights by statute;" 9 therefore, the essential question in Peerless was
whether the members intended to do so with respect to the timeliness of the
notice requirements in particular. Great American Insurance Company, the
third-party defendant, contended that the postponement of effective cancellation
would unreasonably amend the insurance contract to provide fifteen days of cov-
erage for which it would not be entitled to collect premiums. 120 Furthermore,
policy holders could abuse such an extension, avoiding payment indefinitely by
writing bad checks or making frequent minor changes in the policy. 121
The majority position adopted in Peerless concerning extension of coverage
assumes that insurers may not logically issue a notice of cancellation for non-
payment of premiums until the insured is actually in default.122 The purpose of
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. Peerless, 317 N.C. at 145, 343 S.E.2d at 539.
117. Peerless, 78 N.C. App. at 777, 338 S.E.2d at 572.
118. Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 400,405, 324 S.E.2d 868, 872, rev'd, 315
N.C. 262, 337 S.E.2d 569 (1985).
119. See Teeter, 9 A.D.2d at 181, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 616; 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance
§ 36 (1980); 12A G. COUCH, supra note 35, § 45:722.
120. Appellant's Brief at 4, Peerless.
121. See, eg., Green v. J.C. Penney Auto Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1983) (after the check
was dishonored upon a second presentment the policy holder had held insurance for two months
without providing consideration); Crisp v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 408, 124
S.E.2d 149 (1962) (by changing the coverage two months after inception the policy holder had held
insurance for more than four months without making full payment).
122. Accord Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Person, 164 Ga. App. 488, 489, 297
S.E.2d 80, 82 (1982).
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the notice provisions is to provide the insured with an opportunity to acquire
substitute insurance and to rectify a potential violation of the law.123 If this
purpose is accomplished by notice referring to the expiration date and warning
of the consequences of failure to pay, 124 prospective notice fulfills these goals as
well as extended notice. Although the implications eluded the court in Peerless,
perhaps the answer lies in the Faizan discussion of legislative intent: a grace
period beyond the terms of the contract eliminates the gap between termination
of insurance and notice of termination to government officials who may then
take preventive action. 125 Because the predominant goal of financial responsibil-
ity legislation is to create a resource for compensation for potential accident
victims, 126 the general assembly is justified in modifying the terms of the insur-
ance contract to assure that the State has adequate opportunity to revoke the
registration of a formerly insured driver.
In applying its conclusions, the Peerless majority disregarded the weight of
authority rejecting the possibility of providing coverage proportionate to partial
payment. 127 In spite of its brevity and lack of reference to available precedent,
Judge Webb's dissenting opinion advocated the most acceptable result under the
circumstances.128 By retaining Freeman's thirty dollars, Great American gave
him reason to believe he had insurance and, therefore, the court could have
estopped the company from denying the existence of a contract. 129 However,
Freeman failed to discharge his obligation of consideration "when due" upon
renewal of the policy. Although the final notice designated a division of the
payment period, 130 the contention that the company pro-rated insurance cover-
age through October 14, 1981, so that it could not demand payment and give
notice of conditional cancellation on that date, is unsupportable.' 31
By accepting partial payment for an automobile liability insurance renewal
contract, Great American unnecessarily subjected itself to the demands of the
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act. The purpose of financial responsibility
legislation is not to force insurers to provide free coverage for undesirable cus-
tomers, but to protect their potential accident victims who would otherwise face
the same difficulties the insurer faces when attempting to hold an insured finan-
cially responsible. Public policy dictates that insurers must agree to accept some
percentage of high-risk clients but, if proper procedure is followed, the insurer is
123. See Green, 722 F.2d at 332.
124. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 7 N.C. App. 152, 159, 171 S.E.2d 601, 605 (1970).
125. See Faizan, 254 N.C. at 55, 118 S.E.2d at 308-09.
126. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hendrickson, 1 Conn. App. 409, 472 A.2d 356 (1984); Mc-
Garrah v. Stockton, 425 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Perkins v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
274 N.C. 134, 161 S.E.2d 536 (1968); Crisp v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 408, 124
S.E.2d 149 (1962) (all of which construe partial payment as effective acceptance of an offer to insure
or renew but also as grounds for cancellation by appropriate measures).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
129. See Hendrickson, 1 Conn. App. at 411-12, 472 A.2d at 358.
130. Record at 34, Peerless. At the upper right hand corner of the final notice, the account
statement showed that no payments had been received and that $25.77 was due under the "2 Pay
Option." Id. Neither party submitted other evidence of a credit arrangement.
131. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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in no way prevented from terminating a contractual relationship when the con-
tract is breached. Consequently, in spite of the questionable rationale of its
opinion, the majority of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Peerless cor-
rectly subordinated the interests of insurers to those of innocent motorists in
holding the insurer to the terms of the contract. In this case, however, Free-
man's failure to discharge his obligation of consideration entitled Great Ameri-
can to take advantage of the opportunity to escape responsibility, which it
accomplished by providing the requisite notice of cancellation.
JENNIFER ANN WEST
